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Abstract. Blind signature schemes, as important 
cryptographic primitives, are useful  protocols that guarantee 
the anonymity of the participants. In this paper, a new blind 
signature based on the strong RSA assumption  is presented. 
The  new blind signature scheme is quite efficient and state-
free. It does not require the signer to maintain any state and 
can be proven secure against adaptive chosen message attack 
under a reasonable tractability assumption, the so-called 
Strong RSA assumption. Moreover, a hash function can be 
incorporated in to the scheme in such a way that it is also 
secure in the random oracle model under the standard RSA 
assumption. 
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1.  Introduction  
A blind signature scheme is a protocol allowing Bob to obtain a valid signature 
for a message m from a signer Alice without her seeing the message or its 
signature. If Alice sees m and its signature later, she can verify that the 
signature is genuine, but she is unable to link the message-signature pair 
to the particular instance of the signing protocol that  has led to this pair. 
The concept of a blind signature scheme was introduced by Chaum [2]. It 
allows to realize secure electronic cash systems protecting customer's 
privacy (e.g. [1], [3], [4], [5], [7], [8]) as well as other cryptographic 
protocols protecting the participant's anonymity (e.g. secure voting 
protocols [12]). Two proposals for blind signature scheme have been 
published: the first, presented in [2], is based on the RSA scheme, and the 
second is described in [6].  
 
R. Gennaro, S. Halevi, and T. Rabin [11] recently discovered efficient, 
state-free signature schemes based on the strong RSA assumption. Their 
schemes contains several signature schemes, but the only fully proved 
scheme requires a “rap door” or “chameleon” collision-resistant hash 
function with the following very special property: its output is a prime 
number. Implementing such a hash function is both awkward and 
potentially computationally expensive.  
 
The strong RSA assumption (SRA) is that the following problem is hard to 
solve: 
Given a randomly chosen RSA modulus n and a random Z nz
* , find 1r  
and Z ny
*   such that zyr  .  
Note that this differs from the ordinary RSA assumption (RA), in that for 
RA, the exponent r is chosen independently of z, whereas for SRA, r may 
be chosen in a way that depends on z. The SRA is a potentially stronger 
assumption than the RA, but at the present time, the only known method 
for breaking either RA or SRA is to solve the integer factorization problem. 
 
In this paper, we propose a new blind signature scheme. Our scheme is 
more efficient  and state free and can solve the above the problem related 
to “trap door”  or “chameleon” collision-resistant hash function. While the 
signing algorithm still has to generate a prime number, it has a great deal 
of flexibility in how this is done, yielding a much more efficient algorithm.  
 
The security of our new blind signature scheme is against an adaptive 
chosen message attack, as defined in [10].  To prove our new scheme is 
secure, we need the strong RSA assumption, recently introduced by 
N.Baric and B.Pfitzmann [16]. We also need a collision-resistant hash 
function and a universal one-way hash function [12]. Our new scheme is 
desirable in that they are state-free, unlike other provably secure schemes 
[8, 9]. Of course, we achieve this at the expense of using a potentially 
stronger assumption than that is made in [8, 9].  
 
We are not making use of the “random oracle” model of computation [11],  
in “random oracle model” (a random database for keys and users etc) 
where all parties have access to a public random oracle that provides a 
bridge between cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice,  but 
rather, we are working in the “real world” of computation. Indeed, the 
standard “hash and invert” RSA signature is provably secure in the 
random oracle model under the standard RSA assumption. We also make 
the further observation that another trapdoor hash function can be 
incorporated in to our new scheme in such a way that they are also secure 
in the random oracle model under the standard RSA assumption. In this 
sense, our scheme can be made to be at least as secure as a standard RSA 
signature.  
 
Our new scheme can be seen as an improved variation of the scheme of R. 
Cramer  and  V. Shoup [10].   
 
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we introduce a basic 
signature scheme and then the new blind signature scheme is presented as 
an improvement in section 3. Conclusions are included in section 4. 
 
2.  Basic Signature Scheme 
 
In this section we describe the basic signature scheme.  The scheme is 
parameterized by two security parameters k and l, where l + 1 <k. 
Reasonable choices might be k = 512 and l = 160. The scheme makes use 
of a collision-resistant hash function H whose output can be interpreted as 
a positive integer less than l2 . A reasonable choice for H might be SHA-1.  
For a positive integer n, we let QRn  denote the subgroup of Z n
* of squares 
(i.e., the quadratic residues modulo n).  
 
Key Generation  
Two random k-bit primes p and q are chosen, where 1'2  pp  and 
1'2  qq  with both 'p and 'q  prime. Let n = p q and  the following are 
also chosen:  
1. random numbers QRnxh ,  
2. a random ( l + 1)-bit prime e' 
The public key is 
)',,,( exhn . 
The private key is   
( p; q ) . 
 
Signature Generation  
To sign a message m (an arbitrary bit string), a random (l + 1) bit prime 
'ee   and a random QRny ' are chosen. The equation  
)'(xHxhye   
is solved for y , where x' satisfies the equation 
H(m)h '' ' xy e  . 
Note that y can be calculated using the factorization of n in the private key. 
The signature is  
)',,( yye . 
 
Signature Verification  
To verify a putative signature )',,( yye  on a message m, it is first checked that 
e is an odd (l+1)-bit number different from e'. Second, )('' '
mHhyx e
 is 
computed. Third, it is checked that )'(xHhyx e
 . 
 
Lemma 1: The above signature scheme is secure against adaptive chosen 
message attack, assuming the strong RSA and assuming that H is collision 
resistant. 
 
3.  New Blind Signature Scheme  
 
In this section, we design a new blind signature scheme based on the basic 
signature scheme, and  prove that the new result is  a blind signature scheme. 
 
First we give a formal definition of the blindness for a signature scheme. 
Let V denotes Alice's complete view of an execution of the protocol, i.e. 
her random coin tosses and all exchanged values; and let (m, sig(m)) 
denote the message- signature pair generated in that particular execution.  
 
Definition 2. A signature scheme is called blind if Alice's view V 
and the message-signature pair (m, sig (m)) is statistically independent.  
 
The following protocol is a blind version of the modification of strong 
RSA described in Section 2. Suppose n) (mod h  x . 
Step 1. Alice randomly chooses QRny '  and computes )(mod  x
~ y' nR   
and sends Ry
~
,' to  Bob. 
Step 2. Bob randomly chooses QRn ,  and computes  
)n (mod 
~
  ' Rmx   ,  ))(mod'(~ nxHm   
)H(x'h 
~ RR  (mod n), )(mod~' nmayu   
          and sends u to Alice. 
Step 3. Alice computes )''(mod qpdub   , bhy  (mod n)  and sends y to 
Bob. Where   e is a random odd integer in QRn and )''(mod1 qped  . 
Step  4. Bob verifies )(mod   
?
nRye  . 
Note: Alice is trusted only if the verification )(mod   
?
nRye   is passed or 
not. 
 
We describe the blind signature scheme as follows for blind proof: 
 
                       Alice                                                                     Bob  
         QRny '  , )(mod
'~ nx yR       
Ry
~
,'                            QRn ,  
                                                                     Rmx
~
'            
                                                                        )H(x'h 
~ RR  (mod n)  
                          u           )(mod~' nmayu   
       )''(mod qpdub  , bhy  (mod n) y       Verify )(mod   
?
nRye   
 
Theorem 3: The pair )',,( yye  is a valid signature of message m for the 
modification of strong RSA presented in Section 2 and the above protocol 
is a blind signature scheme.  
Proof: The validity of the signature )',,( yye  can easily be shown as 
follows.  
mayuedueb ~'   (mod p’q’) 
hence 
)(mod h ~
~'~' )H(x' nRRh
mx yh mayhuheby
e    
which means that )',,( yye  is a valid signature of m .  
 In order to prove the blindness of the protocol, we show that given any 
view V and any valid message signature pair (m, )',,( yye ), there exists a 
unique pair of blinding factors   and  . Because Bob chooses the 
blinding factors   and   at random, the blindness of the signature 
scheme follows.  
 
If the signature )',,( yye of m has been generated during an execution of 
the protocol with view V consisting of 'y (public), )(mod
~ ' nxR y ,  
)''(mod qpdub  ,  bhy  (mod n), then the following equations must hold 
for   and  : 
Rmx
~
'   (mod n) 
))(mod'(' nxHayu    
)H(x'h 
~ RR  (mod n)  
By the strong RSA assumption , the blinding factors   and  are uniquely 
determined by the first two equations:  
))'('
~
(
)''(
xmHayR
muxay


 (mod n), 
)(mod
)
~
')'((
)
~
)'('(
n
RayxmH
RuxHx

  
Because )''(mod1 qped  , we obtain: 
)'')(mod'('~' qpxHaymayuedueb    
therefore: 
Rye  (mod n). 
 
The proof of the security of the new blind scheme is omitted here, as it 
can be shown in a similar way to that in [10]. 
 
Notes that the signature verification algorithm does not need to verify that 
e is prime. This is better than  R. Gennaro, S. Halevi and T. Rabin's 
scheme [11]. We need a collision-resistant hash function  but a universal 
one-way hash function [12] is sufficient. Our new scheme is state-free, 
unlike other provably secure schemes in  [8, 9]. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have developed a new blind signature scheme based on 
strong RSA assumption. The security of our scheme is guaranteed by 
Lemma 1. The new blind scheme is state free and much more efficient 
and it does not require the signer to maintain any state, and can be proven 
secure against adaptive chosen message attack under a reasonable 
tractability assumption, the so-called Strong RSA assumption. Moreover, a 
hash function can be incorporated in to the scheme in such a way that it is 
also secure under the standard RSA assumption. 
 
References 
 
[1]    D. Chaum: Blind Signature Systems, Advances in Cryptology , Crypto '83 ,    
         Plenum, pp: 147-153. 
[2]    Jan Camenisch and Markus Michels, Separability and Efficiency for        
        Generic Group Signature Schemes in Advances in Cryptology –  
        CRYPTO '99.,  Springer Verlag,   pages 106-121. 
     [6]     D. Chaum, T. Pedersen: Wallet databases with observers, Advances in        
        Cryptology,  Crypt '92,  LNCS 740, Springer Verlag, pp. 89-105. 
    [8]    R. Cramer and I. Damgard. New generation of secure and practical RSA- 
          based   signatures.  Advances Cryptology, Crypto '96, pages 173-185,  1996. 
 [9]    C. Dwork and M. Naor. An efficient existentially unforegeable  
        signature scheme and  its applications. In Advances in Cryptology- 
             Crypto '94,  pages  218-238, 1994. 
 [10]   R. Cramer, V. Shoup. Signature schemes based on the Strong RSA  assumption,  
               6th   ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security,    
                  Singapore,  ACM   Press,   November 1999. 
 [11]    R. Gennaro, S. Halevi, and T. Rabin. Secure signatures, without trees or  
            random   oracles.  Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypto '99 , pages   
           123- 139,  1999. 
 [12]   M. Naor and M.Yung. Universal one-way hash functions and their  
           cryptographic applications, In 21
st
 annual ACM  Symposium on  
           Theory  of Computing, 1989 
 [13]   M. Bellare and P . Roga way . Random oracles are practical: a  
          paradigm for  designing  efficient protocols. In First ACM Conference      
           on   Computer and   Communications  Security , pages 62-73, 1993.  
 [14]    Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard M. Adleman. A Method    
          for   Obtaining  Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems,  
                Communications  of the ACM  21,2 (Feb. 1978), 120--126. 
  [15]  H. Wang,   Y. Zhang,  J. Cao, V. Varadharajan, Achieving Secure and   
               Flexible M-Services Through Tickets, IEEE Transactions Special issue on  
               M-Services. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Sybernetics.  Part A,  
               Vol. 33, Issue: 6, pages: 697- 708, Nov. 2003. 
  [16]   N. Baric and B. Pfitzmann ,collision-free accumulators and fail-stop  
           signature schemes without trees,  Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypto   
           '97 ,  pages 480-494, 1997. 
  
